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LOCAL LEGISLATION
Section 7 of the 3d Article of the Constitution of Pennsylvania directs that "the General Assembly shall not pass
any local or special law," upon a large number of subjects.
One of these subjects is the regulation of the affairs of
counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs or school districts.
Legislation Concerning Cities
The Constitution itself classifies areas of the State into
cities, boroughs, townships, counties, school districts. Any
legislation concerning the affairs of cities-all cities, would
be valid, therefore, although it did not operate upon boroughs or townships. If the same regulations are found by
the legislature applicable to both cities and boroughs, it is
not necessary that one act should establish these regulations for cities and another for boroughs. A single act may
establish them for both kinds of municipalities.' But members of the same kind of municipality e. g. cities, may differ
from each other so materially, that a law or regulation suitable to some would not be suitable to others. Referring to
laws of Philadelphia concerning quarantine, lazaretto, the
'Comm.

vs. Shafer, 32 Super. 497. Boards of health in all cities

and boroughs are authorized by the Act of June 24th, 1895, to adopt
regulations for the construction of house drains and cesspools, and
for the registration of plumbers. The Act is constitutional.
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board of health, shipping and pilotage, inspection of banks,
beef and pork, etc. Paxson, J., remarks, "we have but to
glance at this legislation to see that the most of it is wholly
unsuited to small inland cities, and that to inflict it upon
them, would be little short of calamity. Must the city of
Scranton, over 100 miles from tide water, with a stream
hardly large enough to float a batteau, be subjected to quarantine regulations, and have its lazaretto? Must the legislation for a great commercial and manufacturing city, with
a population approaching 1,000,000 [this was written in
1875] be regulated by the wants or necessities of an inland
city of 10,000 inhabitants?" This difficulty could be overcome, by allowing each municipality to procure from the
legislature exactly the legislation which it deems useful
to it.
But that is the situation which it was the apparent intention of the constitution makers-to destroy. Legislation
for each city, would be local legislation; and the Constitution forbids local legislation concerning the affairs of cities.
Classification of Cities
Still purposed, despite the Constitution, to legislate for
Philadelphia, differently from Pittsburgh, and for Pittsburgh differently from the less cities, the legislature in
the Act of May 23d, 1874, created three classes of cities, so
defining the first that Philadelphia would be the only member of it, and so defining the second that Pittsburgh would
be the only member of it. Then, instead of legislating for
Philadelphia or Pittsburgh, the General Assembly would
legislate for cities of the first class and for cities of the second class, and the same specificity the same localism of
legislation would be possible as if the Constitution had not
prohibited local and special legislation concerning these and
other cities.
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Only Three Classes of Cities
Classification of cities being allowed, it becomes important to know what limit is to be set to it. If cities may
be classified according to population, there may be cities of
one class whose population ranges from 1,000 to 15,000, of
another whose population ranges from 15,000 to 20,000,ete
The legislature began by forming three classes, altho all but
two cities, fell within the third class. It then, in 1876 increased the number to five, and finally in 1887 to seven. The
found to be
formation of more classes than three has been
2
unnecessary, and therefore unconstitutional.
The Criterion of Classification
Paxson, J., asserts that, "there can be no proper classification of cities or counties, except by population. The moment we revert to geographical distinction, we enter the
domain of special legislation for the reason that such classification operates upon certain cities or counties to the perpetual exclusion of all other. ' 3 Population is the criterion
adopted for the classification of cities.' Why the possibility
of the members of one class migrating into a higher class,
should be suffered to have value, it is difficult to see. A
classification based on unchangeable characteristics is at
least, ao good as one founded on accidental and variable attributes. Some cities are on navigable arms of the Atlantic; on the Delaware River. Their situation makes certain
regulations, as to pilots, quarantine, etc., necessary, which
can never be necessary to a city differently situated. Population has no relevancy. Should Harrisburg ever become
greater than Philadelphia, it will still remain true, that the
topography of. the latter will compel it to have regulations
2Ayar's
Scranton
'Comm.
'Phila.

appeal, 122 Pa. 266; Meadville City vs. Dickson, 129 Pa. 1;
vs. Ansley, 34 Super. 133.
v. Patton, 88 Pa. 258.
v. Westminster Co., 162 Pa. 105; Scowden's Appeal, 96

Pa. 422; Phila. Coal and Iron Co.'a Petition, 200 Pa. 352.
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which will forever be useless to the former. Size of population is not the only determinant of legislation. The result of adhering to population as a test, is to compel the
changing of the amount of population from time to time, in
order to keep Philadelphia and Pittsburgh in different
classes, and maintain the possibility of differently regulating them. 1ad the original limit, 300,000, been adhered to,
Pittsburgh would be in the same class with Philadelphia,
and the same laws for both would be unavoidable. If
Pittsburgh reaches 1,000,000, and it surely will, it will be
necessary to shift the dividing number between the first
and second classes to 1,500,000 for the mere purpose of making possible, a different legislative treatment, in essential
respects, of the two cities. The "perpetual exclusion" of
Pittsburgh from the class to which Philadelphia belongs,
will be brought about by a change of legislation, if not by
the adoption in the classifying law of natural and therefore
unchangeable criteria.
That certain members of the same class as defined by
population may need different regulations, is illustrated in
Commonwealth vs. Shafer.- The Act of June 24, 1895,
authorizes the board of health of cities and boroughs to
adopt regulations for drainage and cesspools, and for the
registration of plumbers, "provided that the provisions of
this act shall not apply to boroughs having no system of
water supply or system of sewerage." This is a division
of the class of boroughs into those which do, ahd those
which do not, possess these systems-of water supply and
sewerage. The former are legislated for; the latter not.
The law was held to be valid. The subclassification is not
founded on population.
'32 Super. 497.
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Affairs of Cities
The Constitution forbids local or special laws regulating
the "affairs" of cities. It is impossible so to define the
word "affairs" as to make predictable the view which the
court will take whether any given law, deals with affair&
A law creating building inspection and regulating the construction of buildings in a city regulates "affairs" of cities.
So does one providing that if one owner is about to excavate
upon his premises not more than 15 feet, the owner of the
next lot, on which is a building, must at his own expense
underpin and protect the building.7 The Act of July 9, 1897,
which was, to provide for the classification of real estate for
the purpose of taxation, and for the election of assessors,
and prescribing their duties in cities of the second class,
dealt with an "affair" of cities of that class." Regulations
for drainage and plumbing in cities of the second class pertain to their affairs," as does a law authorizing all cities and
boroughs, to adopt regulations for drainage and cesspools,
and for the registration of plumbers. 0 Regulating the consolidation of contiguous cities whether in the same county"
or not,'" and-providing for the annexation of any city, borough, township or part of a township, to a city in the same
county" pertains to the affairs of cities. The practice of the
business of undertaking in cities, is an affair of cities. The
Act of June 7, 1895, P. L. 167, making it a misdemeanor to
practice undertaking, without a license, etc., in cities, is
"Wheeler vs. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338. Dictum of Paxson 1.

'Schuck vs. McKennan, 11 Super. 84, applicable only to cities of
the second class.
'Philadelphia Company's Petition, 210 Pa. 490; Bruce vs. Pittsburgh, 166 Pa. 152.
'Beltz vs. Pittsburgh, 211 Pa. 561.
"Comm. vs. Shafer, 32 Super. 497.
"Sample vs. Pittsburgh, 212 Pa. 533.
"Pittsburgh's Petition, 217 Pa. 227.
"Sheradan Borough, 34 Super. 689.
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not invalid because local. Legislation necessary for cities,
might be unnecessary, or even detrimental for smaller communities.' 4 Prescribing what motive power may be used
on the streets of cities deals- with an "affair" of cities. An
act authorizing passenger railways to use other than horse
power, on streets in cities of the first class, is valid.'
A
law for the appointment of a collector of delinquent taxes
and water rents in cities of the second class, deals with an
affair of cities,'" as does one pertaining to the creation by a
city of further indebtedness. An act providing for the increase of the debt of cities of the first class is not unconstitutionally local.' 7 Lighting the streets of a city is a city
affair,"M as is sewerage and the discharge of sewage into
streams." An Act i. e. that of March 18, 1875, providing
that in cities of the third class all real estate shall, for purposes of taxation, be arranged in three classes, upon which
different rates of assessment shall be imposed, deals with
an affair of cities.20 The levy and collection of its taxes is
an affair of a city. 21
Not Affairs of Cities
Williams, J., says, that cemeteries even within cities, are
not a part of the municipal machinery, not an affair of a
city which could be dealt with by a law applicable to a
"Comm. vs. Hanley, 15 Super. 271.
"Reeves vs. Phila. Traction Co., 152 Pa. 153.
16Kilgore vs. Magee, 85 Pa. 401.
17Wbeeler vs. Phila., 77 Pa. 338.
"Wyoming St., Pittsburgh, 137 Pa. 494.
"Comm. vs. Emmers, 221 Pa. 298.
"Appeal of City of Scranton School District, 113 Pa. 176. The
act was void because it does not operate on such cities of the third
class as do not by ordinances accept its provisions.
"Comm. vs. Maciferron, 152 Pa. 244.
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class of cities. 22 Yet it is said that an act authorizing any
school district, under certain circumstances, to take parts of
burial grounds for school purposes, is a local act regulating the affairs of school districts..2 3 The transfer by married
women of loans of the State of Pennsylvania, or of the city
of Philadelphia, is not an affair of the city.24 Prescribing
maximum car fares, is not an "affair" of cities of the second
class which can be regulated by law applicable only to these
cities. 25 An act, relating to cities of the second class, providing for the levy, collection and disbursement of taxes
and water rents, providing that delinquent taxes shall be
liens whether the real owner is named or not, does not pertain to an "affair" of cities of that class. It does not relate
to the exercise of any corporate power, nor to the number,
character, powers and duties of any municipal officer, nor
to any subject under the control of the city government.
It is a special and local law, authorizing the creation, extension and impairment of liens, and prescribing the effect
of judicial sales of real estate.26 School affairs, are not
affairs of the city composing the school district. A law
regulating the affairs of school districts and of sub-school
districts in cities of the second class, is local and void.2 '
The incorporation of street railways is not an "affair" of a
city, so that it can be differently regulated in cities of the
"Philadelphia v. Cemetery Co., 162 Pa. 105. A cemetery outside
of a city even if its drainage pours into a stream from which
any part of the water supply of the city was obtained, is not an
affair of the city, which can be regulated by a law applicable to
cities of a particular class.
"York School District's Appeal, 169 Pa. 70.
"Loftus v. F. & M. N. Bank, 133 Pa. 97.
"Ashworth v. Pittsburgh Rwy. Co., 231 Pa. 539. It is not a
regulation of the use of streets, as in Reeves v. Phila. Traction Co.,
152 Pa. 153.
'Deposit & Trust Co., v. Fricke, 152 Pa. 231.
"Chalfant v. Edwards, 173 Pa. 246.
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second and third classes from other parts of the State.2 8
The promotion of the public health in cities is not an affair
of cities. Legislation could not prevent the sale of cigarettes to minors or oleomargarine to anybody in cities, or in
classes of cities. It does, not follow that the Legislature
may not forbid the erection of hospitals in cities, because
hospitals are dangerous only when there is a thick population near them, and this occurs only in cities. Such legislation would concern not the "affairs" of cities, but the
public health. 29 A law providing that applications made
by guardians, executors, etc., for leave to sell the land of
a decedent for the payment of his debts, in cities of the third
class, should be presented not to the court having jurisdiction of the petitioners' accounts, but in the Quarter Sessions, would be a local law, and unconstitutional because
it relates to the exercise of no corporate power residing in
the cities, nor to the duties of their officers, nor to the needs
and welfare of citizens of those cities, as distinguished
0
from other citizens of the Stat 30
Providing for the assessment of damages from the opening of streets is not an
affair of cities; hence provisions for such assessment peculiar to cities of the first class would be unconstitutionally
local.31 The collection of non-municipal taxes, within cities
or boroughs, is not an affair of such cities or boroughs.
Hence, if the Constitution prevents local or special laws for
such collection, the classification of cities would be irrele3
vant. The act would be local.
Operation of Act Dependent on Approval
An act may be made by its terms, to operate only in
counties, cities, etc., which consent to its operation. The
"Weinman v. Rwy. Co., 118 Pa. 192.
wComm. v. Hospital, 198 Pa. 270.
*Wyoming St., Pittsburgh, 137 Pa. 494.
t
Ruan St., 132 Pa. 258.
"Van Loon v. Engle, 171 Pa. 157.
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Act of June 23d, 1885, P. L. 142, in its first section repeals
the Act of 1700, commonly known as the fence law. The
second section, however, requires the voters of any
county to express whether they desire that it should take
effect, and declares that the act "shall not take effect in
any county" until it is ascertained that its provisions are
desired. The result is that the law will operate in one
county while it does not operate in another. It is a local
law, affecting the affairs of counties, and void." However,
a similar statute receives. a different treatment, in McGonnell's License. 8 The first section of the Act of April
18th, 1899, P. L. 68, declares that the Act of April 11th,
1866, prohibiting the licensing of selling, and the selling
of intoxicants in Potter county, "is hereby repealed," but
the second section adds the proviso, -Provided said repeal
shall not go into effect unlesa a majority of duly qualified
voters of said county shall vote in favor of said repeal,
"at an election to be held in a manner prescribed." The
court astutely discovered that this was a law permitting
licenses in Potter county, unless the people thereof voted
that there should be no license. "Though the electors of
Potter county," says Brown, J., "were to vote 'repeal' or
'no repeal,' they really voted 'license' or 'no 4icense.'""
Acceptance of Act a Condition of Its Operation
The operation of an act may be unconditional, as to certain members of its class, and conditional as to others, on
the acceptance of its provisions by them. The Act of March
18th, 1875, concerning cities of the third class, provided that
no city of the third class, nor any city of less than 10,000
inhabitants heretofore incorporated, should be subject to
13Frost vs. Cherry, 122 Pa. 417.
u2O9 Pa. 325.

"Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491; O'Neil vs. Ins. Co., 166 Pa. 72; Smith
vs. McCarthy, 56 Pa. 359; Comm. vs. Painter, 10 Pa. 214, are referred to.
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its provisions until the same should be accepted by ordinance. The result would be that there would be cities incorporated of less than 10,000 not subject to the Act of
1875, until acceptance, cities made of the third dlass under
the Act of May 23d, 1874, between that date and March
18th, 1875, not subject to the Act of 1875, until acceptance,
and cities of the third class created since March 18th, 1875,
and therefore unconditionally subject to it. This elective
clause in the Act of 1875, made it local and void." The Act
of March 24th, 1877, authorizes cities whose population
does not exceed 30,000 and is not less than 8,500, and which
by ordinance of councils accept the provisions of the act,
to elect a recorder, who shall have a defined jurisdiction.
The act is local and void. "They [statutes] are local," says
McCollum, J., "because confined in their operations to cities
of a specified population, which shall accept them! by ordinance duly adopted by councils and approved by the mayor.
Whether they shall apply to a city of the class described,
depends on the action of its municipal officers; and in consequence thereof, one city of the class may be subject to
their provisions, and other cities of the same class may be
exempt from them. 7 The Act of 1874 provided for school

districts in cities of the third class. The Act of May 23d,
1889, P. L. 274, constituted each city of the third class to
be hereafter incorporated a school district, but contained
provisions different from those of the Act of 1874. It
also provided that any then existing city of the third class
might become subject to it, by a resolution of the school
boards. In refraining from peremptdrily subjecting exist-

ing school districts to its provisions, it created a second
type, side by side with the type originated by the Act of
1874. It was therefore held local and unconstitutional for
"Scranton School Distriet's Appeal, 113 Pa. 190.
"Comm. vs. Denworth, 145 Pa. 172. The act would have been
void without the conditioning provision, because the subjects were
not classified ina permissable way.
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reasons that prevailed in Scranton School District's Appeal.3 8 It may be remarked that the vice of both the Act
of 1875 and of 1889, was not in providing for the assimilation of the cities or school districts created under the Act
of 1874 to those created under the Act of 1875, and 1889,
but in not assimilating them peremptorily. Allowing them
the option made possible the co-existence of two types
created by legislation since the adoption of the Constitution.
Inconsistent Decisions on Necessary Acceptance
The Act of May 23d, 1874, which provides for the incorporation of cities of the third class, undertakes, in its
fifty-seventh section, to provide for the subjection to it,
of cities of the third class already in existence, by reason of
their having 10,000 or more inhabitants, and of cities of
less than 10,000 which were not made cities of the third
class. Sucfi cities, says the section, may become subject
to the provisions of this act, by an ordinance, duly passed,
and certified to the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and by the certificate by the Governor, of the
surrender of the former charter. "From the date of such
certificate," says the section, "the said city shall be governed, controlled and regulated by and under the provisions
of the act," of 1874. It is clear that the third class of cities
is by this act divided into those existing previontsly to
May 23d, 1874, and those which came into existence under
the act; that is, the class is broken into two sub-classes.
Upon one of these sub-classes, the Act of 1874 operates, unconditionally; upon the other, it operates only with the
consent, expressed by ordinance, etc., of the particular city.
Having once decided this act, for this reason, to be local

and void,49 the court after a rehearing decided that it was
wCommonwealth vs. Reynolds, 137 Pa. 389.
*Reading v. Savage, 120 Pa. 198.
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not local and that it was valid. 40 The reasons are wholly
unsatisfactory. In order t& distinguish the case from
Scranton School District's Appeal 4 1 Green, J., declares that
the clause suspending the operation of the act on the passage of an ordinance, is disabling in one case, and enabling
in the other. The distinction is baseless. In both cases,
the act legislates for cities of the third class, to be formed
under the act, in the earlier case, of 1875, in the later of
1874. "No city * * * shall become subject to the foregoing
provisions of this act until," etc., is the language of the
former. "Any city *** may become subject to the provisions of this act * * * by any ordinance," etc., is that

of the latter. They both exclude the cities in question
until, they both include the cities in question, when the
ordinance is adopted. They both operate on a sub-class
of cities of the third class, one, on so many cities as had
been in existence prior to 1874, the other on so many as
had been in existence prior to 1874, and so many as, having come into existence since 1874, were already in existence in 1875. The justification of the Act of 1874, is that,
furnishing a new type of cities of the third class, it provides for the abandonment by earlier cities of their variant
types, and their adoption of one and the same type. The
Act of 1875 creates a type which is variant from the typeis
of the pre-1874 cities and also from that of the cities formed
under the Act of 1874, but it also furnishes a method by
which the pre-existing cities may adopt this latest type.
If the Act of 1875 is to be held void, and that of 1874 valid,
it must be because, in the latter the Legislature creates only
one type for the third dlass, ,since the Constitution was
adopted, whereas, by the Act of 1875, the Legislature,
having created one type, undertakes to create another, and
allow the first created type to persist, unless and until the
*Reading v. Savage, 124 Pa. S2.
&122 Pa. 176.
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several cities bearing it, choose to abandon it for the later.'
Section 41 of the Act of May 23d, 1874, declares that cities
of the third class shall constitute one school district, and
after providing for the election of school directors and the
organization of the school board, a proviso follows to the
effect that none of the provisions of the act shall be applicable to the election of school directors or controllers,
etc., but laws heretofore enacted shall be applicable in
cities of the third class in existence prior to 1874 if the
acceptance of the Act of 1874 by a city of the third class
shall be accompanied by a certificate of the school district
expressing the desire to retain the former laws. The school
district is authorized from time to time, to accept any one
or more of the provisions of the Act of 1874 concerning
school matters. These provisions do not make the fortyfirst section of the Act of 1874 invalid, with respect to
school districts. 3
"2The power to adopt all the provisions of the act of 1874 isnot
the power to adopt some and not others of them. The act of April
11th, 1876, P. L. 20, undertook to give the latter power to cities of
the third, fourth and fifth classes. As that act is unconstitutional
the latter power conferred by it does not exist. Meadville City v.
Dickson, 129 Pa. 1.
"Comm. vs. Middletown, 210 Pa. 582; Comm. vs. Guthrie, 203 Pa.
209; Com. v. Gilligan, 195 Pa. 504.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH vs. KEMMERER
Murder-Drunkenness as a Defence-Negligent Handling
Deadly Weapons-Lack of Specific Intent

of

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Indictment for murder. Defendant proves that he had been
drinking heavily and was deeply intoxicated, so much so that
he did not know that what he had in his hand was a gun, and
what he was doing would discharge its contents. The killing
occurred by discharge of a gun under his manipulation. The
court said that, if he was too drunk to be able to intend death,
he could not be guilty of murder of the first degree. It refused
to say that if he was too drunk to have any intention whatsoever, as to the gun's discharge, or as to a trespass on the
body of deceased, he could not be convicted of any crime.
Conviction of second degree murder. Appeal.
Johnson, for Plaintiff.
Yaste, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
LERMAYER, J.-The sole question for the determination
of the court is of what crime is defendant guilty.
The counsel for the defendant contends that the prisoner ig
guilty of manslaughter, and counsel for plaintiff contends that
he is guilty of second degree murder.
We think he is guilty of second degree murder. In this
case, the indictment is for murder. Defendant proves that he
had been drinking heavily and was deeply intoxicated, so much
so that he did not know that what he had in his hand was a
gun, and that what he was doing would discharge its contents.
The killing occurred by a discharge of a gun under his manipulation. The court said that if he was too drunk to be able to
intend-death, he could not be guilty of murder of the first degree. It
refused to say that if he was too drunk to have had any intention whatever, as to the gun's discharge or as to a trespass on
a body of the deceased, he could not be convicted of any crime.
Conviction of second degree murder and defendant appeals.
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Drunkenness is no excuse for crime of murder. Commonwealth vs. McMurray, 198 Pa. 51; Commonwealth vs. McManus,
143 Pa. 64; Commonwealth vs. Gentry, 5 Dist. 703; and if it
were, men who intended to commit killing would secure impunity
by first making themselves drunk. Keenan vs Commonwealth
44 Pa. 55; Goersen vs. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 477.
Legal effect of drunkenness most frequently contended for
is its reduction of murder from what would, without it, be
of first degree, to second degree. The statutes make murder
consisting of "willful deliberate and premediated killing"
murder of first degree, and other kinds murder of second degree, as shown in the case at bar and in Pamphlet Laws 382.
The absence of deliberation and intention and of the power
ta deliberate and intend, may, nevertheless be consistent with
presence of malice and of other elements of murder of second
degree, so that prisoner may properly be convicted of murder of
that degree. Commonwealth vs. Platt, 11 Plfila. 415, 421; Warren vs. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. 45; Nerling vs. Commonwealth,
93 Pa. 323; and Meyers vs. Commonwealth, 83 Pa. 31.
If defendant relies on his intoxication, the burden is on him to
furnish evidence of it, and of degree of it necessary to reduce
grade of crime e,. g., from murder of first degree to murder of
second degree. Commonwealth vs. Woodley, 166 Pa. 463; and
Commonwealth vs. Hort, 2 Brewst, 546.
Drunkenness, while able to reduce murder from first to
second degree, is not able to reduce homicide from murder to
manslaughter. 2 Brewst 546. In Commonwealth vs. Crozier, 1
Brewst 349, it was decided that unless intoxication amounts to
insanity, i. e., to delirium tremens, which would destroy responsibility in law, evidence of intoxication can avail only to
reduce the offence from first degree to second degree murder. In
Penna. vs. McFall, the law was that homicide by a drunken
man was more than manslaughter because-no provocation, no
assault upon prisoner by deceased was shown.
Penna. Statute of Homicide is, "All murder which shall be
perpetrated by means of poison or ling, in wait or by any
other kind of willful and premeditated killing, or 'which shall
be committed in perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any
arson, rape, robbery or burglary, shall be deemed murder of
first degree, and all other kinds of murder shall be of second
degree."
If one is so drunk that he cannot commit murder of first
degree, but drunkenness is not so great as to exclude all responsibility, i. e, if it does not mount to delirium tremens, it will
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only avail defendant, as reducing his defence from first degroe
murder to second degree murder.
We therefore are of the opinion that defendant is guilty
of second degree murder as found in the lower court.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Drunkenness is no excuse for a crime. This platitude often
meets us in the dissertations of the courts. Of course a crime
is -acrime; and a crime is ex vi termini, inexcusable. The question is, may an act, which, if done by a sane and sober man, is
a crime, not be a crime if done by an intoxicated man?
The guilt of an act depends, usually, on the cornmixture with objective fact, of a state of mind of the doer. A
somewhat, termed malice, must co-exist with the death-producing act, in order to make it murder. Another somewhat,
termed an intention to kill, must accompany it, in order to
make it murder of the first degree.
That a man can be too drunk to form the intention to kill
and; in doing the lethal act, to have aimed at the production
of death any observer of the phenomena of drunkenness may
know, and the courts also know of it.
Can he be too drunk to have been malicious in the legal sense
of that term? We shall not discuss this question in the abstract, but in relation to the actual case.
The defendant did not make himself drunk in order to
commit some aggression on somebody. He drank because he
liked liquor, or the physical and mental effects of stimulation.
His desire, so far as appears, was entirely self regarding. He
aimed at no action that might ensue from an intoxicated state.
Can we say that if a man drinks to ebriety, and then kills some
one his act of killing is, ipso facto, malicious? Is it malice not
ta have foreseen that a homicide was a possible result of inebriation? Or does the absence of his foresight plus the actual
sequence of a killing, affect the latter act with malice? We
think not. If one drinks in order to get drunk in order to commit -a homicide and he cormmits 'it, the homicide, his antisocial state of mind before drinking may sensibly be linked with
the sequent act, whatever the state of obtuseness and stupor,
and inappreciation of consequences, at the moment of acting.
The defendant did not know that the thing in his hand was
a gun, or that what he was doing with it, would project from it
a ball ,into the body of a human being. He had formed the
intention at no time, to do harm to any body. To impute
"malice" to him is to make the word meaningless, unless malice
is not the frame of mind which accompanies an act, but simply
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an epithet used to justify the attitude of vindictiveness which
the state assumes toward it. Death has happened. It is a consequence of intoxication. Therefore it shall be ranked with cases
in which there was a purpose to cause harm; or a recklessness
as to the possible harmful results of an act.
That a killing may be purposely done by a drunken man,
and yet be a homicide of less grade than murder, is recognized
by cases holding that drunkenness may make morbidly susceptible to a provocation, and hence make a homicide but manslaughter, which without it, would be murder. 1 McClain Crim.
Law, p. 129. If a purposed killing may, in consequence of drunkenness, be eviscerated of malice, it is very hard to see how
malice is to be detected in the act of this defendant, -who intended harm to nobody, and did not know that what he was doing, would, or probably would inflict hurt on anybody.
The caution is given sometimes, that men may make themselves drunk in order to kill. But the case before us is one
whose facts are established, and they negative the intended
connection between the drinking and the homicide. There was
no objective motive for the indulgence, and no act with a view
to the effectuation of any particular thing.
What is the object of treating a killing of the sort which
we are considering as a malicious homicide rather than as manslaughter? The only excuse would be, to warn against intoxication, by putting a heavier penalty than would be imposed, were
it treated only as manslaughter. But, the possible penalty for
the milder offense is surely severe enough when the culprit
his simply indulged his appetite for liquor over much, with the
wholly unintended consequence of a death.
In dissenting from the result reached by the learned court
below, we must concede that he had .ample ground, in the dicta
of judges ,for the judgment given.
Reversed.
WILLIAM THORPE vs. WILLIAM ALLISON
Fee--Exec ory Devise-iWills
Will-Interpretakion--Qualified
Act of 1917.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
X, by will, devised his land to William Thorpe, whom he
had brought up as a son, though not related to him. The words
were: "To William Thorpe I give what he would take were he
my only son. Should he have no issue at the time of his death,
I give it to such persons as would then be my heirs." William
Thorpe has died childless, but devised the land to his brother.
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William Allison is the person who would be heir to X, and he
has taken possession. This is ejectment.
Robert L. Myers, Jr., for Plaintiff.
Paul Ridgeway for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
STAPLETON, J.-The question involved in the case at
bar is one of construction,-whether the intent of X and the
meaning of his will were to create a limitation on the estate of
William Thorpe, or merely a provision that, in case of the death
of William Thorpe without issue, before the vesting of the estate in him by the death of X, the estate that William Thorpe
would have acquired is given to the heirs of X, as they nght
then be.
The cardinal rule of construction is that the intent of the
testator is to be gathered from the will, taken as a whole (1
Yeates 518, 115 Pa. 590). In the determination of the testator's
intention, the question is not what the testator meant, but
what is the meaning of his words (112 Pa. 532, 125 Pa. 323). In
doubtful cases of construction, the law favors an absolute,
rather than a defeasible estate; a vested rather than a contingent one; the first taker, rather than the second one, as the
principal object of the testator's bounty; and that. distribution
which conforms as nearly as possible to the general laws of inheritance. 23 Pa. 9.
Here we are to discover what is meant by the sentence in

XIs will, as follows: "Should he have no issue at the time

of

his death, I give it to such persons as would then be my heirs."
This sentence is largely interpreted by the one which precedes
it: "To William Thorpe I give what he would take were he my
only son." It is evident from these words that X intended that
an estate absolute should pass to William Thorpe,-that he
should acquire an estate in fee simple. The Court is of the
opinion that the words, "should he have no issue at the time
of his death," constituted a mere provision that, in case of the
death of Villiam Thorpe, without -issue before the vesting of
the estate in him by the death of X, the estate that William
Thorpe would have acquired was to be given to the heirs of X,
as they might then be. In no sense can these words be construed as a limritation on the estate which vested in William
Thorpe, upon the death of X.
The counsel for the plaintiff has ably established the vesting
of a fee simplle estate in William ThoIp. Tde defendant admits this fee simple, but contends that the alleged limitation

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

145

upon the estate of William Thorpe constituted it a "qualified
fee." This is not the case. From a proper construction of X's
will, we conclude that William Thorpe received no qualified fee,
and that there was no executory devise over to "such persons
as would then be my heirs;" but that the estate which vested
in William Thorpe, since he survived X, was absolute.
Since an estate in fee simple comprises the entire interest
and property in the land, it follows that one who grants a fee
simple thereby grants away his whole interest in the property.
Tiffany on Real Property, p. 52. The owner of an estate in fee
simple has the unlimited power to sell and transfer it. .53 Pa. 211.
The estate which William Thorpe took by the will of X
was a freehold estate of inheritance in fee simple,-the entire
and absolute ownership of the land, and of indefinite duration.
This is the highest estate known to the law, and is freely
alienable.
The Court, therefore, concludes that, in the case at bar,
ejectment will lie against William Allison; and judgment is
accordingly rendered for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
That William Thorpe would take an absolute fee simple, but
for the sentence beginning with "Should he have no issue," is
undeniable. The important question is the meaning of these
words.
There are many cases in which, a gift having been made
to X and his heirs, it is provided; but, if he should die without
issue, then over, and such limitation over is held to import
merely a substitution of a different devisee for the one first
named as such, to take place if the first devisee should predecease the testator. Were this the meaning, the words would not
qualify the fee given to Thorpe, inasmuch as he did not die
before the testator. Neubert vs. Colwell, 219 Pa. 248; Morrison
vs. Truby, 145 Pa. 540. There are many others of like significance.
But can we suppose the sentence under discussion to refer
to Thorpe's death before the testator? His dying before the
testator would, whether with or without. children or issue, defeat the gift to him. The death of a devisee before the testator
makes him an impossible devisee. Whether Thorpe, so dying,
should have issue was immaterial, for, -even were there issue,
it or they would take nothing. There is no gift to issue, and
there is no statute whicln provides for the substitution of issue in such a case. The Wills Act, P. L. 1917, p. 408, Sect. 15a.
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If the testator intended to condition the gift of Thorpe, on
Thorpe's living longer than himself, his intention needed no
expression. The law already imputed such an intention. But,
had he desired to express such intention, a more natural method
would have probably been adopted. The will could have said,
"If Thorpe survives me, I give, etc.; and. if he does not survive
me, I give to my brother, etc." Reference to issue would be
unnecessary.
This reference indicates that the testator is thinking of the
Inability of the estate given to Thorpe, and vested in him, to
descend upon his heirs, because of the absence of issue, and not
because, in consequence of Thorpe's death before the testator,
no estate had vested in him capable of passing to issue.
That the death of Thorpe is conceived as to happen after
the testator's death is indicated by the form of the phrase,
"Should he have no issue at the time of his death, I give to
such persons as would then be my heirs." If the death of
Thorpe before himself was meant, the person taking alternatively would be his heirs at his death. The intention would
bave been expressed by the words, "Should his death precede
mine, I give the land to my heirs."
We think that the testator intended that, should the fee
vest in William Thorpe, it should be divested, on his death
without issue, and leap over to his heirs. This death without issue has happened. The executory interest in William Allison
has become vested. The land is his. The plaintiff is not entitled
to recover.
Reversed.
KEENE vs. HALBERT
Married Woman's Contract to Sell Her Separate Real PropertyNon-Joinder by Husband-Part Payment and Iw~provemontz
by Vendee--Ejectment-Reimbursement of Vende. for Parchase Money and Improvements.
STATIMENT OF FACTS.
Mrs. Keene, a married woman contracted to convey a farm
to Halbert, her husband, not joining in the contract. Halbert
paid $1,000 part of the price of $4,000, took posesion and
spent $1,000 in improving the property. The husband refused
ultimately to unite in a deed of conveyance and Mrs. Keene
brings this action of ejectment. Halbert insists that she should
not -recover until whe reimburses him to the extent of $2,000, and
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also until she pays the value of the bargain, i. e., the difference
between the $4,000 and the greater value of the land which his
evidence shows to be worth $6,000.
Sharfsin for Plaintiff.
Vaughn for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BARNHARDT, J.-In this case the acceptance of part payment by Mrs. Keene and the improvements and expenditures
made by Halbert took the case out of the Statute of Frauds.
Milliken vs. Dravo, 67 Pa. 230. Delivery of possession, part payment and valuable improvements is the full measure required to
take a case out of the Statute of Frauds.
The Act of 1893 gives a married woman the power that a
feme sole has to sell her property except that she cannot make
a conveyance. In this case Mrs. Keene was bound by her contract to sell, even though she could not make a conveyance.
McCoy vs. Niblick, 221 Pa. 123, hqld under the Act of
1893 a woman may "sell" her real estate and make any contract "necessary, appropriate, convenient or advantageous" to the
exercise of her right to sell; but she may not perform her con
tract to sell without the joinder of her husband in the conveyance. She, therefore, knows when. she enters into the contract
to gsell, that she takes the chances, as well as her vendee, that
her husband may not join in the deed, and that neither can
compel specific performance if he refuses to join. But she
knows that her contract or agreement to sell is a valid one even
if neither she nor the vendee may be able to have it specifically
enforced, and therefore, whatever the vendee may pay on it, or
expend in pursuance of it, must be returned to him by her,
when she finds that she cannot specifically perform.
In the same case on an appeal 228 Pa. 342, a married woman may make a contract for the zale of land and if for any
reason she is unable to execute it, she must return to the Tendee whatever payments or outlays he may have made in 'reliance on the contract.
The Act of June 8, 1893, P. L. 344, in part says: A marned woman can no longer repudiate her contract for the sale
of her real estate, in which her husband has not joined on the
ground that it is void, and keep what has been paid to her on
account of it or expended by her vendee in pursuance of it.
This covers the contention of the plaintiff that Mrs. Keene
could not convey and therefore Halbert could not take anything.
The cases of McCoy'vs. Niblich and Stephens vs. Barnes, 30
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Sup. 127, establish the fact that Mrs. Keene can recover only
after paying Halbert the purchase money paid, the money he
used for improvements, and interest on the money used.
The rule of law in Pennsylvania is that when the vendor
without fraud on his part is incompetent to make out a title the
vendee is not entitled to damages for the loss of his bargain
beyond the money paid, -with interest and expenses, although
the completion of the bargain might have been profitable to him.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
It is somewhat peculiar that a married woman may without the husband's consent, make a contract to convey her land,
although without his consent, she cannot perform it. Her contract, though not specifically enforceable, if the husband refuses consent, may be otherwise enforced, i. e., by a compulsion to pay damages.
The vendee is justified in paying all or some of the purchase money, and on taking possession of the premises, in
spending money in their improvement. He has the possession of
the land as a security for repayment, should the conveyance be
ultimately prevented by the husband's non-concurrence in the
conveyance.
The vendor's attempt to recover the land by ejectment will
be thwarted altogether if the husband does not refuse to enable
her to make the conveyance. If he does refuse, she will be permitted to terminate the vendee's possession but only on the
condition that she reimburse him for such loss -s he will suffer.
Here $1,000 has been paid as purchase money, and $1,000
has been expended in improving the land. These must be refunded before the vendee will be required to yield up the possession.
A married woman in ejectment, may recover a judgment,
to be enforced by habere facias possessionem, only on the repayment of these moneys. McCoy vs. Niblick, 221 Pa. 123; 228
Pa. 342.
The value of the bargain cannot be recovered by a disappointed vendee of land in Pennsylvania, in the absence of
fraud by the vendor. Halbert cannot recover the $2,000 or any
less sum, as the value of the bargain.
The learned court below has made a correct disposition of
the questions presented and its judgment must be
Affirmed.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

149

WILSON vs. KESSLER
Private Carriers-Distinguished From Common Carriers--Degree of Care Required-Destruction of Goods by Negligence
of a Third Party-Measure of Damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The material facts in the case are these: Kessler had an
auto truck and was in the business of hauling household goods
from house to house. He did not advertise that he would serve
anybody and everybody, but he usually accepted orders brought
to him. He was engaged to haul the domestic effects of Wilson,
including carpets, beds, chairs, tables and clothing of himself
and family. In hauling these goods the truck had to cross a
railroad. In doing so it was run down by a train, wholly through
the negligence of the railroad company.
The lower court allowed a recovery, not of the amount at
which the goods could have been sold, but for the price of
new goods of the same sort less a reasonable reduction for the
effect of wear on their serviceability.
Phillips for Plaintiff.
McCready for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE CO.URT.
SHELLY, J.-The first question tobe -settled is whether Kessler
Is a common carrier or a private carrier, for upon that question
rests the right of recovery. If Kessler is a common carrier then
he would be liable for the loss and damage of all goods entrusted to him except where the loss occurred through inevitable accident, or act of God, Vale's Elementary Principles of
Pennsylvania Law, Vol. 1, p. 98; 6 Cyc. 376; i. e., he would become an insurer of the goods entrusted to him, Dobie on Bailments and Carriers, paragraph 116, p. 324, citing 19 Wyo. 410,
118 Pac. 649, 119 Pac. 875. But if Kessler is not a common carrier and only a private carrier, then his liability is limited, only
to such losses or injuries as Yesulted from his negligene or
that of his servants, 158 N. Y. 34; a private carrier for hire
is not an insurer and is therefore like other ordinary bailees,
liable for loss, or damage to, the goods only when it is due to
his negligence; Dobie, supra, p. 299; 9 Pa. 148; 57 N. Y. 236;
Vale, supra, 97; 1 W. & S. 285.
A common carrier is one who undertakes for hire or reward to transport the goods, of such as choose to employ him,
from place to place, 6 Cyc. 365. A common carrier, according
to Mr. Dobie, supra p. 300, is one who holds himself out in the
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exercise of a public calling, to carry goods, for hire, for who
soever may employ him. A very few cases have held one to be
a common carrier of goods in the absence of a holding out to
serve the public, but as Mr. Dobie says, this test is happily
applied but to two states, Pennsylvania and Tennessee. A private carrier is one who without being engaged in the business
of carrying as a public employment, undertakes to deliver goods
in -a particular case for hire or reward, 5 Rawle 179; he may
carry or not as he deems best; he is but a private individual,
and is vested, like all other private persons, with a right to
make his own contracts, 10 C. J. 38. Dobie, supra, defines a private carrier as one who, without engaging in such business as
a public employment, undertakes by special contract to transport goods in -particular instances from one place to another, i.
e., he is a carrier who carries not by virtue of a public profession, but according to special contracts which he makes in individual cases. Mr. Vale's (supra) definition of a private carrier is one who, although not engaged in such business as a
pablic employment, occasionally carries goods from one place
to another.
The distinction between common and private carriers is: A
private carrier is not bound to carry for any reason unless he
enters into a special agreement to do so, while a common carrier is bound to carry for all who offer such goods as they are
accustomed to carry and who tender reasonable compensation
for carrying them, and if they refuse to perform their obligations in this respect, they are liable to respond in damages, 4
R. C. L. 549. It is a question of law to determine what constitutes a common carrier; but it ,is a question of fact whether
one charged as a common carrier Is within that definition and is
carrying on his business in that capacity, 174 S. W. 140; and
in order to impress upon one the character and impose upon.
him the liabilities of a common carrier, his conduct must amount
to a public offer to carry for all who tender him such goods as
he is accustomed to carry, 223 Pa. 148; 72 Atl. 516; 2 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 188; 200 Enc. 69; 4 R. C. L. 32, p. 546.
From this foregoing authority, this court assumes the assertion that the burden of proof is upon Wilson to show that
the carrier Kessler is a common carrier within the strict
definition as set forth in the above citations, 6 Cyc. 365; Dobie
300. The court does not think that Wilson has so succeeded and
holds Kessler to be a private carrier. Kessler did not hold himself out to carry for all those who came to him. He did not advertise the fact that he would carry; there is evidence to show
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that he did refise to carry for individuals because- the statemeat of facts avers that he usually accepted. If he wef a common carrier, it would have strengthened the plaintiff's case
materially to have shown why he did not accept thoae who were
excluded by the word "usually" in the statement of facts. The
plaintiff offered no adequate proof to bring this case within the
Pennsylvania rule as set forth in 2 P. L. Digest of Decisions,
Col. 2402, which is: A common carrier is any person holding
himself out for hire to carry goods of all persons indifferently;
whether the transportation be his principal and direct business
or only occasional employment. An English case reported in
100 L. T. Rep. N. S. 855 holds that carmen and furniture removers will generally fall within. the description of a private

carrier.
The attorney for the plaintiff in his able brief set forth
a very good argument as to why the defendant should be class.
ad as a common carrier, on the grounds of public policy. Citing
4 R. C. L paragraph 4, p 547-48, he said: "It would not be
equitable to allow a carrier to stand just within the lines of
private carriers, enjoying their comparative immunity from
liability for damages, and still doing the business apparently
and presumptively of a common carrier."
That is true enough, but a person who desires goods to be
cartied has the right to demand that the private carrier contract against the loss of the goods. If he neglects to do so,
the court will not assume a contract or enforce a hypothetical
one. It is the duty and privilege of such bailor to exercise such
care in the protection of his property and failure to do so Is a
loss which the court cannot relieve. The law applicable to common carriers is peculiarly rigorous, and it ought not to be extended to persons who have not expressly assumed that character, or by their conduct and from the nature of their business justaified the belief on the part of the public that they
intended to assume it, 4 R. C. L. 546.
The carrier in this ease was a private carrier, and thus the
bailment made was an ordinary one, Dobie, supra. 298. The
bailee is liable for ordinary care, and since no evidence is presented to show that the carrier did not exercise ordinary care,
the holding of this court is that no recovery can be had, and
the findings of the lower court are hereby reversed.
OIMNION OF THE SUPREME OOURT
The defendant was a carrier. His businss was to haul
goods from house to house. There ae two sorts of carriers,
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common and private. Since the liabilities of carriers, of the two
sorts, are in the same circumstances different, it is needful to
determine to which class Kessler belonged. The action is, for
damages to the plaintiff's goods. The case excludes negligence
on Kessler's part and fastens on the railroad company, solely,
the negligence which caused the damage. Kessler could nevertheless be liable, if he was a common carrier.. He is not liable
if he was a mere bailee for hire, a private carrier.
What is the note or criterion by vich the two sorts of
carriers are distinguished? What makes a, carrier a common
carrier? Apparently, it is the faot that he holds himself out
as ready to carry for anybody who offers goods for carriage,
and is willing to pay the usual price. "A common carrier,"
says Rogers, J., "has been defined to be one who undertakes for
hire and reward to transport goods of such as choose to employ
him from place to place." Beckman vs. Shause, 5 R. 178.
Church, J., states that "the readiness to carry for all who will
employ, gives the character to the bailment, rather than the
extent of the business or the number of trips performed,"
Verner vs. Sweitzer, 32 Pa. 208. Holding oneself out as ready,
"to engage with anyone who might apply" is the test according to Stewart, J., in Lloyd vs. Haugh, 223 Pa. 148.
Did Kessler so hold himself out? As the liability of a common
carrier is "peculiarly rigorous," it ought not to "be extended to
persons who have not expressly assumed that character, or by.
their conduct * * * justified the belief on the part of the public
that they intended to assume it," 4 Ruling C. L. p 546. The
facts distinctive of the common carrier should clearly appear.
Kessler did not advertise that he would sere everybody.
He usually accepted orders brought to him. His "business" was
that of hauling goods. From these facts may we legitimately derive that he undertook with the public to haul for anybody?
Men in any business usually accept orders brought to them.
They do not arbitrarily reject some and close with others. But
from this fact we cannot infer that they have surrendered
tme discretion, in any particular case. What is there, in the business of shifting articles from place to place, that makes a different inference necessary?
In view of the heavy responsibility, even for the acts of
others without one's own fault, imposed on the common carrier, the evidence should be distinct that any particular car4
Aer is of the sub-class "common." Sufficiently distinct, we do
not -find the evidence here to be.
The conclusion is easy. The private carrier is not liable for
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a damage or loss to the transported goods, which is not attributable to his own wrongful act or to his negligence. The
truck "was run down by a train, wholly through the negligence
of the railroad company."
The able opinion of the learned court below well supports
the judgment rendered.
Affirmed.
CORSON VS. CARLISLE
Trespass for Personal Injuries-Defective Sidewalks-Liability
of Borough-Negligence-Duty of Pedestrians-Conflicting
Testimony-Judgment N. 0. V.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Over a gutter in the town was an iron plate, which in some
way became tilted, and 'remained in that state for a week. Mrs.
Corson was walking and, stepping on the plate, was thrown
down and injured. She testified that she was at the moment
looking ahead.. One of her witnesses testified that the fact that
the plate was tilted would not have been seen by her, had she
looked. Another of her witnesses testified the contrary. The
court allowed a verdict for her despite the defendant's allegation
that her own evidence showed that she had been negligent.
Seitchik, for Plaintiff.
Xde, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THU COURT.
Aylesworth, J.-A recovery of damages by Mrs. Corson, the
plaintiff, must be based upon two elements, the negligence of
the defendant and the absence of contributory negligence of the
plaintiff. The negligence charged to the defendant is in allowing an iron plate over a gutter to remain in a defective conditien. Having placed the iron plate there for the more convenient
use of its streets by the public, the borough must use reasonable
care to keep it in such condition that the public may pass. over
it in safety, and it is liable in damages for injuries sustained by
reason of a failure to perform this duty. But the borough is not
negligent in failing to repair a defect unless it had notice,
actual or constructive, that such defect existed. The borough
has constructive notice where the defect might have been known
by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Whether the existence of
the defect for a week without discovery and repair shows a failure to exercise such reasonable diligence is a question for the
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jury. At the trial the jury found for the plaintiff. We can therefore assume that the jury considered the question of the defendants negligence and found it negligent.
The second element, that of the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff, is the only one in dispute in this appeal. The defendant contends that the testimony of one of the plaintiff'e
witnesses shows that the plaintiff was negligent, and that because of this negligence, as a matter of law, its request for
judgment N. 0. V. should have been granted.
The plaintiff herself testified that at the moment she was
looking ahead. That is what a person ordinarily is expected to
do. A pedestrian, in using a public sidewalk, must be observant
and careful how he is going, so as to avoid dangers which ordinary prudence would disclose, although he is not required to
keep his eyes fastened on the ground continually to discover
points of possible danger, or even exposed pitfalls lying directly in his path, Lerner vs. Philadelphia, 221 Pa. 294. Nor is
a pedestrian bound to make a critical examination of a grating
in a sidewalk before stepping upon it. McLaughlin vs. Kelly,
230 Pa. 251. The burden of proving contributory negligence is
always on the defendant, never on the plaintiff to disprove it.
By her own testimony the plaintiff has made out a prima facie
case, free from contributory negligence and on this she would
be entitled to go to the jury.
One of the plaintiff's witneses testified that the fact that
the plate was tilted would not have been seen by her, had she
looked. This we think relevant not so much to prove or disprove plaintiff's negligence but, on the other hand, as bearing
on the question of the defendant's negligence. If the Iron plate
could not be seen by reasonable observation to be in an unsafe
or defective condition, the defendant could not be charged withl
notice of the defect and hence could not be held liable for the
injury. Duncan vs. Philadelphia, 173 Pa. 550.
Another of plaintiff's witnesses testified that the fact that
the plate was tilted would have been seen by her, had she looked. This certainlyetends to show negligence on the part of the
plaintiff. A person is bound to see obstructions or defects which
are of a visible character, Robb vs. Connellsville. 137 Pa. 42,
and a pedestrian cannot hold the municipality liable for injury
received in broad daylight through a defect in a sidewalk, if
there was nothing outside himself to prevent his seeing the de-

feet or which would excuse his failure to observe it. Lvrner vs.
Phelldwa, 22 Pa. Ot4
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The defendant argues that the testimony of this witness
shows such negligence on the part of the -plaintiff that, as a
matter of law, the defendant would be entitled to judgment
notwithstanding the verdict of the jury for the plaintiff. With
this we cannot agree. We think the question of the plaintiff's
negligence 'was a proper one for the jury and not for the court.
Where the facts are simple and the evidence by which they are
presented is involved in no uncertainty their legal value is for
the courts to determine. Kleckner vs. C. R. R. of N. J, 258 Pa.
461, but unless the whole evidence shows negligence so clearly
that no other. inference can be drawn from it, the court cannot
draw the inference as a conclusion of law. Ely vs. Pittsburgh,
Etc. Ry., 158 Pa. 23S. In granting a motion for judgment N. 0.
V. it must appear that there is no conflict of evidence as to a
material fact, Dalmas vs. Kemple, 215 Pa. 410, and the plaintiff
must be given the benefit of every fact and inference pertinent
to the issue which the jury could legitimately find from the evidence before .them. Strawbridge vs. Hawthorne, 47 Super. 64T.
Applying these principles, plaintiff's negligence under the evidence was not a matter of law for the court to determine but
clearly a question for the jury. Wertz vs. Williamsport, 67
Super 156. If a plaintiff's testimony makes out a clear case, the
contradictory testimony of another witness, though called by the
plaintiff, will not as a matter of law destroy it. Ely vs. Pittsburgh, Etc. Ry., 158 Pa. 233; Collins vs. Philadelphia and Reading Ry., 63 Super. 371; Martin vs. Traction Co., 261 Pa. 96;
Kohler vs. Penna. R. R. Co., 135 Pa. 346; Smith vs. Harwood
Electric Co., 255 Pa. 165.
We can find no error in the refusal of the trial court to
grant defendant's motion for judgment N. 0. V. and its decillto
is therefore affirmed.
OPINION OF' THE SUPERIOR COURT
jury
has found that the borough was negligent in sUfThe
fering the iron plate to be in its condition so long as a week
The duty of a borough to keep watch over its streets and to
prevent holes and obstacles to safe walking, is not to be denied.
The decision that failure to correct the displacement of the
plate within so long a time as one week, cannot be deemed unreasonable.
That the condition of the plate was the cause of the injury
to the plaintiff is not disputed.
The learned court below has well said that the critical
question is whether negligence of the plaintiff co-opeated with
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that of the defendant, in the causation of the accident.
Negligence is not presumed. What is there to show that
Mrs. Corson was negligent? Only two facts: (a) she was not
looking on the ground, when she was thrown down; (b) the
testimony of one of her witnesses, that had she looked, she
would have discovered that the plate was tilted.
As to the last, the witnesses disagreed. Which told the
truth? Only the jury can decide. Eby vs. Rwy. Co., 158 Pa. 233.
-Clark vs. Lancaster, 229 Pa. 161. The jury has, it appears, -believed the witness who said that even looking, the plaintiff
would not have seen that the plate was tilted. It might legitimately have so concluded, and, were it necessary to sustain the
verdict, we should infer that it did so conclude.
Mrs. Corson was not looking at the ground, when the accident occurred. Let us for the moment concede that she was
negligent in this. Negligence per se has no legal consequences.
It must appear that it caused the injury. One of the witnesses
testifies that, even had she been looking, she would not have
seen that the plate was displaced. This witness may have been
believed by the jury. If so, the jury found no causal relation
between the failure to look (negligent, let us assume) and the
fall. Mrs. Corson would have done what she did, even had she
looked, end would not have been negligent in so doing.
But, was she negligent in not looking towards the plate?
It would be preposterous to say that one must recognize that
he Is at a street crossing, and must keep his eyes fixed upon the
gutters. In many, in possibly most cases, he must. But, the
court could not say, in any particular case, described as in
this, that omission to look is negligence. The jury must answer
that question.
The jury has not distinctly said that Mrs. Corson's not looking was not negligent, but it has said either that it was not
negligent, or that it did not cause the injury, and both of these
facts, negligence and causation must be found to coexist.
The judgment of the learned court, supported by a very
lucid opinion, must therefore be affirmed.
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Cases on the Law of Evidence, by Edward W. Hinton, Professor of Law in the University of Chicago. The West Publishing Co., St. Paul; 1919.
In this compilation, covering 1,100 large pages, are comprised hundreds of the most important and decisive adjudications of the English and American courts, on the subject of evidence. The cases are classified in a very scientific manner. On
the apportionment of function between court and jury, cases
are given which cover over 100 pages. The second division is
Witnesses, 'which embraces nearly 300 pages. The subdivisions
are competency, required witnesses, privilege, examination of
w'itnesses. Under competency, are considered intelligence and
religious belief of witnesses, infancy, interest, both at common
law and under statutes, marital relationship, and official connection with the tribunal. Three hundred pages are devoted to
hearsay, under which the general rule excluding hearsay is first
treated, and then the recognized exceptions. These are reported
testimony, dying declarations, admissions and confessions, entries and statements against interest, entries in regular course
of business, official registers and reports, reputation, statements
about pedigree, spontaneous statements. Over 40 pages are essigned to cases on opinions and concusions; 100 pages to circumstantial evidence. To the best evidence principle, over 40
pages are allotted. The last chapter devoted to the Parol Evidence rule, embraces over 50 pages.
There are other very valuable collections of cases on eviso
dence; e. g. Thayer's, Wigmore's. It is surprising to find
which
and
utilized,
heretofore
not
decisions,
of
number
large a
admirably explain important principles. Hinton's collection can-not fail to be very useful to practioners, as well as students.
It is a great convenience to have in one volume, such a large
number of the most important adjudications on so weighty
subject and so suggestively and philosophically classified.

